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RESTRICTIONS ON SHORT SALES: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE UPTICK RULE AND ITS
ROLE IN VIEW OF THE OCTOBER 1987
STOCK MARKET CRASH
Jonathan R. Macey, t
Mark Mitchell, tt
and Jefry Netter ttt
On October 29, 1929 the stock market crashed. Congress used
the crash as an opportunity to introduce the pervasive regulation of
securities markets that exists today. One of many practices for
which Congress considered regulation appropriate was short sales.
Representative Adolph Sabath of Illinois wanted to ban all short
sales' in order to "eliminate what we term 'short selling' . . . the
greatest evil that has been permitted or sanctioned by the Govern-
ment that I know of."2
Fifty-eight years later, on October 19, 1987 the stock market
crashed again. In response to the crash, Congress and other regula-
tors once again have called for increased regulation of the securities
markets. And as before, there have been calls for increased regula-
tion of short sales, although now the calls for regulation of short
sales extend to the derivative markets as well. For example, Con-
gressman Edward Markey, Chairman of the House Telecommunica-
tions and Finance Committee, reportedly considered a plan to limit
short sales in the futures market.3
Short sales provide a convenient target for criticism since they
allow investors to profit when a stock price falls. In a short sale, an
investor who expects a stock price to fall sells borrowed stock so
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
tt Office of Economic Analysis, Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or
the author's colleagues on the Staff of the Commission.
ttt Department of Finance, University of Georgia.
1 H.R. REP. No. 4639, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
2 Short Selling of Securities, 1932: Hearings on H.R. 4, H.R. 4604, H.R. 4638 H.R.
4639 Before the House Comm'n on the Judiciary, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1932) (here-
inafter House Hearings].
3 See Clough, Markey May Try to Limit Short Selling in Futures, INVESTMENT DEALERS
DIG., May 30, 1988, at 11. See also Mayer, Some Watchdog, How the SEC Helped Set the Stage
for Black Monday, 67 BARRON'S 18 (1987).
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that he can profit by purchasing the stock in the future at a lower
price. 4 Commissioner Joseph Grundfest of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC"), commenting on calls for more strin-
gent regulation of short sales, said that political support for
restrictions on short sales arises because: "When you sell short, you
are in a sense betting against the team. At a minimum, it is an emo-
tional issue." 5
Short sales are criticized for their potentially harmful effects on
both individual companies and the entire market. At one level,
short sales facilitate the manipulation of stock prices. Allegedly,
speculators sell stock short, spread false rumors about the company,
and then purchase shares after the stock price has fallen. The repu-
tation of the company can be damaged, perhaps irretrievably.6 In
addition, short selling can exacerbate a market decline. Many argue
that in the 1920s bear raids began the stock price decline that
turned into the crash. In the 1980s, program trading, which in some
situations relies on short selling, is a frequently cited villain of in-
creased market volatility in general and the October 19, 1987 crash
in particular.
In contrast, some view short selling as an economically benefi-
cial practice that promotes market efficiency. Short selling provides
a method by which investors who know that a security is overvalued
can trade on the information, thereby promoting more efficient pric-
ing. Short selling facilitates arbitrage and enables investors to
hedge against stock price declines, allowing investors to take larger
positions which in turn adds liquidity to the market. Finally, index
arbitrage, the type of program trading that involves short selling,
promotes the linkage between the futures and cash markets and thus
improves both the general efficiency of the securities markets and
their ability to allocate capital to its highest valued uses.
In this paper we review the theoretical and empirical evidence
on both short sales and restrictions on short sales, concentrating on
the uptick rule. The uptick rule, Rule lOa-1, implemented in the
wake of the 1929 crash and changed only slightly since then, states
that a "short sale can only occur at a price above ("plus tick") the
4 In 1987 there were a record high 3.98 billion shares sold short on the NYSE
(3.11 billion in 1986), of which 3.05 billion (777%) were made by NYSE members. See
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., 1988 FACTBOOK (1988) [hereinafter NYS FACTBOOK].
The short interest (total number of shares sold short that have not been covered) on the
NYSE rose in 1987, peaking at 546.3 million shares in August.
5 Vise, Are Short Sales on the Up & UP? NYSE Suspects Violators, But Can't Find Them,
Washington Post, May 8, 1988, at HI, col. 5.
6 See Ingrassia & Chipello, Loaded for Bear Raid by Short Sellers on a Once Sleepy S&L is
Bruising Both Sides, Wall St. J.,June 16, 1988, at 1, col. 1; Rotbart, Market Hardball, Aggres-
sive Methods of Some Short Sellers Stir Critics to Cry Foul, Wall St. J., September 5, 1985, at 1,
col. 6.
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immediate sale price, or at a price equal to the price of the most
immediate sale if the most recent price change was positive." 7 In
section I we review the legislative history of the uptick rule. In sec-
tion II we discuss short sales restrictions. Section III discusses the
theoretical and empirical evidence on the effect of the uptick rule on
the pricing of individual securities. In section IV we discuss the eco-
nomic arguments and evidence on the effects of the uptick rule on
program trading and on the market. Finally, we draw implications
in section V.
I
HISTORY OF THE UPTICK RULE
Numerous examples exist throughout history of attempts to
regulate or eliminate short sales, including restrictions by Holland
in 1610 and Great Britain during the Middle Ages." During World
War I, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) implemented restric-
tions on short selling because of the fear that short selling could
hamper the war effort by "demoralizing" the stock market. 9 Even
the NYSE Constitution contains a restriction against such "demoral-
izing" practices.' 0
The 1929 crash led to new demands for restrictions on short
selling." In 1931, in an attempt to head off restrictions on short
sales and to gather data on them, the NYSE required exchange
members to mark sell orders as long or short and to report short
interest statistics. 12 In addition, concerns about short selling played
a central role in the 1934 Congressional hearings that led to the
enactment of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.13 At that
time the Senate Banking and Currency Committee found that "few
subjects relating to exchange practices have been characterized by
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Oa-I (1988) contains the most recent variation of this rule.
8 SeeJ. MEEKER, SHORT SELLING 13 (1932).
9 Id. at 122. There was also a fear that enemy agents might engage in bear raids,
which would be feasible since they would be willing to lose large amounts of money if
they could drive the market down. Meeker states that the fear of bear raids was the
origin of the "demoralization clause" that was put into the NYSE Constitution.
10 Id. at 120-24.
11 Meeker notes that the NYSE quickly initiated an investigation and concluded
there was no support for the hypothesis that the crash was due to short selling. Id. at
125.
12 Id. at 147.
13 See REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. REP. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 247 (1963)
[hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY]. See also Short Sales of Securities, Exchange Act Release
No. 13,091 [1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,837 (Dec. 21, 1976)
[hereinafter Short Sales of Securities] for a review of the legislative history of the uptick
rule.
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greater differences of opinion than that of short selling."' 4
Critics of short selling in the 1930s stressed the harmful effects
of bear raids on the pricing of individual securities and the overall
market:
Some speculative operator or group of operators would get
information that an individual, or a group of individuals, was car-
rying a large block of a particular stock with borrowed funds, and
that the price of that stock had declined so much since purchase
that the creditor was asking or on the verge of asking for addi-
tional cash or securities, and that it was doubtful whether the
owner could supply much more of either. The 'raider' would then
proceed to sell the stock short-hoping to push the price down
further, even if only temporarily, to a point at which some of the
hypothecated stock would have to be sold. And he hoped that if
this occurred, such selling would itself drive the price down still
further, giving the raider the opportunity to cover his short posi-
tion at a profit. 15
Critics further alleged that bear raiders spread false bad information
about the stock. The fear was not just that individual stocks would
decline, but that bear raids would drive the entire market down.
Short selling had its defenders, however. In 1931 Richard
Whitney, President of the NYSE, testified that:
[If] there had been no short selling of securities, I am confi-
dent that the stock exchange would have been forced to close
many months ago. It was the willingness of people who had sold
short at higher levels to buy when prices were breaking that
helped to maintain the markets. 16
Another proponent of short selling, J. Edward Meeker, wrote in
1932 that short selling benefited the market by stabilizing price
movements.17
Despite the calls for stringent regulation of short sales, Con-
gress did little to regulate short sales directly in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Instead it gave most of the power to regulate
such sales to the SEC.' 8 In addition, Section 7 of the Act gave the
14 See SPECIAL STUDY supra note 13, at 247. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CUR-
RENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1934).
15 F. MACAULAY & D. DURAND, SHORT SELLING ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
vi-vii (1951).
16 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 97.
17 J. MEEKER, supra note 8, at 13.
18 In its relevant part, Section 10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or to employ any stop-loss order
in connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a
[Vol. 74:799
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Federal Reserve Board regulatory control over margins on short
sales, 19 and Section 16 prohibited short sales by officers, directors,
or shareholders who own 10 percent or more of a class of equity
securities. 20
The SEC took several steps to regulate short sales. In 1935, at
the request of the SEC, 16 exchanges codified the NYSE rule that
members should not effect a sale that would demoralize the mar-
ket.21 This regulation represented an early implicit version of the
uptick rule, since many at this time considered sales, especially short
sales, at a price lower than the last price to be demoralizing. 22
In the fall of 1937 an increase in volume and volatility on the
NYSE occurred contemporaneously with a substantial market de-
cline. The SEC studied the market decline and concluded that, for
leading stocks, short sales comprised a significant part of the declin-
ing market's sales.23 The study suggested that short selling exacer-
bated the market's decline. From this study, and the belief that the
existing exchange regulations were ineffective, came the uptick
rule.24 The SEC felt that this regulation met the three necessary
objectives of a short-sale rule:
(1) Allow relatively unrestricted short sales in an advancing
market;
(2) Prevent short selling at successively lower prices-thus,
eliminate the use of the short sale by the "bear raider" to drive
the market down;
(3) Prevent short sellers from accelerating a declining market
by exhausting all remaining bids at one price level, causing suc-
national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982).
19 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982).
21 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 13, at 251.
22 The SEC had formulated the rule and the exchanges were requested to adopt it.
The SEC anticipated that the rule would "preserve those features of short selling which
are in the public interest." Id. See also FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 16 (1935).
23 Adoption of Regulations Governing Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 1548
[1938-39 Transfer Binder] 2 Fed. Sec. L. Secr. (CCH) 25,153 at 14,115; 25,351 at
14,151 (1938).
24 The 1938 Rule X-3b-3 defined a short sale as:
The term short sale means any sale of a security which the seller does not
own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security bor-
rowed by, or for the account of the seller.
The uptick rule (Rule X-10A-1) stated:
(a) No person shall, for his own account or for the account of any other
person, by the use of any facility of any national securities exchange effect
a short sale of any security at or below the price at which the last sale
thereof, regular way was effected on such exchange.
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cessively lower prices to be established by longer sellers. 2 5
A 1939 amendment changed the rule to the version that exists
today.26 The amendment allowed "short sales at the same price as
the last sale, provided that the last sale price was higher than the last
different price which preceded it."27
No major changes have occurred in the basic uptick rule since
1939, despite numerous calls for changes. The 1963 Special Study
noted that from 1939 to 1963 the NYSE had unsuccessfully urged
the SEC to change the rule, suggesting that short sales be permitted
without restriction at any price higher than the close the previous
day. The Special Study recommended that the rule be supple-
mented, although it did not make specific recommendations. 28 In
1976 the SEC ordered an investigation and request for comments
on whether "regulation of short sales ... is needed in today's regu-
latory environment." 29 The SEC noted:
It appears.., that certain of the major manipulative practices
intended to be remedied by short sale regulation of the type cur-
rently in effect no longer do, or could, afflict today's market in the
same manner they did in the period prior to the adoption of the
existing market regulatory framework. For example, the Commis-
sion believes that, as a result of the improved reporting of transac-
tions in exchange-traded securities (resulting from the
implementation of the consolidated system) and the development
of more sophisticated techniques for market surveillance by the
Commission and various self-regulatory organizations, practices
like the traditional "bear raid" are now much more difficult to en-
gage in, since any attempt at such an effort under today's market
25 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 13, at 251.
26 The rule was changed because there had been a decline of more than 50% in the
volume of short sales, due in part to the requirement that short sales take place on an
uptick. Id. at 252. Aggregate data from this period, which reports total short interest
(number of open short positions), shows that a decline in short positions did not begin
until several months after the February 8, 1938 implementation of the rule. A report
commissioned by the NYSE, F. MACAULAY & D. DURAND, supra note 15, at 59, states
monthly short interest figures for the NYSE from 1931-1948. In the months around the
implementation of the rule the total short interest on the NYSE was: 11/27/37
1,184,215; 12/29/37 1,051,870; 1/27/38 1,249,478; 2/24/38 1,142,482; 3/29/38
1,097,858; 4/27/38 1,384,113; 5/26/38 1,343,573; 6/28/38 1,050,164; 7/27/38
837,063; 8/29/38 729,480; 9/28/38 588,345; 10/26/38 670,330. However, data on to-
tal short interest reveals little about the volume of short sales because short sales may be
made and covered within the data collection period (month), and thus the activities are
not reflected in the short interest figures.
27 Short Selling Rules, Exchange Act, Release No. 2039 [1938-39 Transfer Binder]
2 Fed. Sec. L. Serv. (CCH) 25,351 at 14,115 (Mar. 10, 1939). The SEC also allowed an
exemption from the rule for short sales made for special international arbitrage
accounts.
28 See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 13, at 294.
29 Short Sales of Securities, supra note 13.
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and regulatory conditions is likely to be detected and stopped.30
By 1985, competition from the London Stock Exchange, which did
not have an uptick rule, had prompted the President of the NYSE,
John Phelan, to announce the NYSE was considering loosening the
uptick rule.3' Finally, the NYSE's Katzenbach Report on the market
crash questioned whether the uptick rule was still useful.3 2 The re-
port stated:
In today's market, we doubt whether the continued existence
of the short-sale rule is justified, other than perhaps to provide
some investors with a semblance of confidence in the markets.
The short sale rule favors price movement in the up direction and
attempts to cushion it in a decline. It lacks logic, but may help to
discourage speculation in a down market. However, no such rule
does-or even can-exist on the index futures exchanges, so at
present the rule contributes to tension between related markets. 33
II
PRESENT UPTICK RULE
A. The Rule
The uptick rule, Rule lOa-1, states that: "No person shall...
effect a short sale... (A) below the price at which the last sale...
was reported pursuant to an effective transaction reporting plan; or
(B) at such price unless such price is above the next proceeding dif-
ferent price at which a sale of such security... was reported .... 34
Thus, short sales are only allowed on a plus tick-price above the
price of the last sale, or a zero plus tick-price equal to the last sale
if the last preceding transaction at a different price was at a lower
30 Id The SEC proposed three temporary rules for comment that would have, to
varying degrees, suspended the tick test. However, the SEC withdrew the proposed
temporary rules in 1980, reporting that the few comments received indicated that "the
'tick' test provisions of Rule 10a-1 work well and should not be modified". See Short
Sales of Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17,347, 45 Fed. Reg. 80,834-01 (1980)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1).
31 See McMurray, Big Board May Relax Rule that Bars Short Selling to Depress Share Prices,
Wall St.J., Dec. 5, 1985, at 47, col 1.
32 Report of the New York Stock Exchange, An Overview of Program Trading and its
Impact on Current Market Practices (Dec. 30, 1987).
33 Id. at 17.
34 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0a-1 (1988). The operation of the uptick rule is illustrated by
the following table taken from the SPECIAL STUDY, supra, note 13, at 252:
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price.3 5 The uptick rule applies to any security registered on, or
admitted to unlisted trading privileges on, a national securities ex-
change, whether the trade is made on the exchange or over the
counter. An exchange can choose whether the prices for the tick
test are from trades on its own market or any market in the compos-
ite transaction reporting system.36 In addition, 13 exceptions to
Rule lOa-1 exist.3 7
Sequence Short Sale
of Sale Sale Price Permitted Reason
1 40
2 39 7/8 no Minus tick
3 39 7/8 no Zero-minus tick
4 40 yes Plus tick
5 40 yes Zero-plus tick
6 39 3/4 no Minus tick
7 39 5/8 no Minus tick
8 39 3/4 yes Plus tick
9 39 7/8 yes Plus tick
10 39 7/8 yes Zero-plus tick.
35 Short sales are defined in Rule 3b-3:
The term "short sale" means any sale of a security which the seller does
not own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security
borrowed by, or for the account, of the seller. A person shall be deemed
to own a security if (a) he or his agent has the title to it; or (b) he has
purchased, or has entered into an unconditional contract, binding on
both parties thereto, to purchase it but has not yet received it; or (c) he
owns a security convertible into or exchangeable for it and has tendered
such security for conversion or exchange; or (d) he has an option to
purchase or acquire it and has exercised such option; or (e) he has rights
or warrants to subscribe to it and has exercised such rights or warrants:
Provided, however, that a person shall be deemed to own securities only
to the extent that he has a net long position in such securities.
17 G.F.R. § 240.3b-3 (1988).
36 The major exchanges have chosen to use the last price on their exchange as the
governing price for the tick test for a security traded on one or more securities ex-
changes. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 440.B (1988).
37 The exceptions to Rule lOa-1 are contained in paragraph e of the rule. 17 G.F.R.
§ 240.1Oa-1 (e) (1988). In brief the exceptions are:
(e)(1) Exempts a seller who owns the security sold and intends to deliver
the security as soon as possible, but for some reason must borrow the
security for settlement.
(e)(2) Exempts a broker or dealer from a sale, for an account which he
has no interest, which is marked long even if the sale is in fact short.
(e)(3) Exempts any sale by an odd-lot dealer on an exchange or an over-
the-counter sale by a third market maker to offset odd-lot orders of
customers.
(e)(4) Exempts any sale on an exchange by an odd-lot dealer or over-the-
counter by third market maker to liquidate a long position, which is less
than a round lot, providing the sale does not change the position of the
odd-lot dealer by more than one unit of trading.
(e) (5) Exempts short sales covered by § 240. 1Oa- 1(a) by a registered spe-
cialist, registered exchange market maker for its own account, or third
market maker for its own over-the-counter account (i) effected at a price
equal to or above the last sale regular way, reported for such security
pursuant to an effective transaction reporting plan or (ii) effected at a
price equal to or above the most recent offer communicated for that se-
806 [Vol. 74:799
19891 RESTRICTIONS ON SHORT SALES 807
The uptick rule does not apply to securities traded over the
curity by such registered specialist, registered exchange market maker, or
third market maker if, when the offer was made it was equal to or above
the last sale, regular way, reported for the security under an effective
transaction reporting plan. Under this exception, the major exchanges
may not allow their specialists to avail themselves of the exception to en-
sure that regional market specialists are able to execute their transactions
at the primary market price.
See New York Stock Exchange Rule 440B (b) (1988), which states:
No specialist shall effect on the Exchange a short sale of any security in
which such specialist is registered for his own account or for the account
of any other person in reliance upon the exception afforded by paragraph
(e)(5) of Rule l0a-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended.]
(e)(6) Exempts transactions covered by paragraph (b) of this section on a
national securities exchange effected with the approval of that exchange
that are necessary to equalize the price of the security on that exchange
with the current price on another national securities exchange which is
the principal exchange market for such security.
(e)(7) Exempts certain short sale arbitrage transactions. Exemptions in-
clude trades for a special arbitrage account by a person who then owns
another security (such as convertible rights) by virtue of which he is, or
presently will be, entitled to acquire an equivalent number of securities of
the same class as the securities sold, provided the sale, or the purchase
which such sale offsets, is made for the bona fide purpose to profit from a
current price difference between the security sold and the security owned
and that the right of acquisition was originally attached to another secur-
ity or was issued to all holders of any class of securities of the issuer.
(e)(8) Exempts transactions made on a national securities exchange as
part of an international arbitrage opportunity, where the seller has the
bona fide purpose of profiting from the price difference between the se-
curity on an international market outside the jurisdiction of the United
States and the security in a market within the jurisdiction of the United
States, provided the seller knows or has reasonable grounds to believe
that an offer enabling him to cover such sale is then available in such
foreign security markets and he intends to accept the offer immediately.
(e) (9) Exempts transactions made as part of a special offering plan made
in accordance with a special offering plan declared effective by the SEC
pursuant to paragraph (d) of § 240.10b-2.
(e)(10) Exempts short sales by an underwriter or any member of the dis-
tribution syndicate in connection with the over-allotment of securities, or
any lay-off sale by such person in connection with a distribution of securi-
ties pursuant to § 240.1 Ob-8 or a sitandby underwriting commitment.
(e)(1 1) Exempts certain short sales covered by paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion by a broker or dealer, at a price equal to the most recent offer com-
municated by such broker or dealer if such offer when communicated was
above the price at which the last sale was reported pursuant to an effec-
tive transaction reporting plan or at the price of the last sale if the last
sale price was above the next preceding different sale price at which a sale
of such security was reported pursuant to an effective transaction report-
ing plan.
(e)(12) For the purposes of (e)(8) of this section a depository receipt for a
security shall be deemed the same as the security represented by the re-
ceipt. For paragraphs (e)(3), (4), and (5) of this section the term third
market maker shall mean any broker or dealer who holds itself out as
willing to buy and sell a security for its own account on a regular basis
otherwise than on an exchange in amounts of less than block size.
(e)(13) A broker-dealer that has acquired a security while acting in the
capacity of a block positioner shall be deemed to own the security for the
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counter (OTC) unless the OTC security also is listed on an ex-
change and thereby part of the consolidated transaction system.
OTC securities were historically exempt from the uptick rule be-
cause last sales reports were not available for them, and because
little reason to believe OTC short sales "would have a manipulative
or destabilizing impact on the markets" existed since OTC short
sales were not publicized. 38 However, with the growth of the Na-
tional Market System (NMS), last sale price reporting has become
available for a large portion of the OTC market. The SEC has rec-
ognized the change in the OTC market, and has specifically ex-
empted NMS stocks from Rule l0a-1 until it has completed further
study of short sale regulation of NMS securities specifically, and
OTC securities generally.39
B. The Merrill Lynch No-Action Letter
In December, 1986 the SEC Division of Market Regulation is-
sued a no-action letter to Merrill Lynch for certain sales related to
index arbitrage. 40 The letter stated that the Division would take no
action under Rule 1Oa- I(a) and (b) if those paragraphs were applica-
ble to sales of securities by Merrill Lynch as part of the unwinding of
an index arbitrage position, where the index is the subject of a finan-
cial futures contract (or options on futures) traded on a board of
trade or a standardized option contract. 4' Specifically, the letter
said that Merrill Lynch could sell stock without regard to Rule lOa-
1 (a) and (b) if:
(1) the firm has a long stock position as part of an index arbi-
trage position as described above;
(2) the stock is being sold in the course of "unwinding an
index arbitrage position" as described above; and
(3) the sale would be deemed to be a short sale as defined in
Rule 3b-3 solely as a result of the netting of the index arbitrage
long position with one or more short positions created in the
course of bonafide arbitrage, risk arbitrage, or bonafide hedge ac-
tivities as those terms are employed in Securities Exchange Act
purposes of § 240 3b-3 even if the broker dealer does not have a net long
position in the security if and to the extent the broker dealer's short posi-
tion in such security is offset by positions created in the course of bona
fide arbitrage, risk arbitrage, or bona fide hedge activities.
38 See Short Sale of Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-22,414, [1985-86
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,915, at n.15.
39 Short Sales of Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-22,975, 45 Fed. Reg.
8801-01 (1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1).
40 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1142C3, at 76,167 (Dec. 17, 1986).
41 Id.
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Release No. 15,533 (January 29, 1979).42
The no-action position resulted from a request originally out-
lined in a 1986 letter from Merrill Lynch to the SEC. That letter
noted how the interaction of the uptick rule and definition of short
sales, and certain activities undertaken by Merrill Lynch, hampered
Merrill Lynch's index arbitrage abilities. 43 Merrill Lynch engaged in
bona fide arbitrage, risk arbitrage, and bona fide hedging.44 Merrill
Lynch also engaged in index arbitrage.45 At some point in index
arbitrage there is an "unwinding transaction," which is either an
elimination of each long or short position at the expiration of the
futures or option contract, or the earlier termination of both the
stock and futures or options' positions. Because it is important to
be able to unwind quickly in order to preserve the profit opportu-
nity arising from the difference in the futures and cash (stock)
prices, the uptick rule, which slows the ability to sell stock, can inter-
fere with index arbitrage.
The legal problem in index arbitrage for a firm such as Merrill
Lynch that engages in all the above transactions arises because the
definition of short sales fails to consider all economically equivalent
securities in defining a net long position. At some point in un-
winding an index arbitrage position involving the sale of stocks,
Merrill Lynch, even if long in all stocks in the index arbitrage de-
partment, may be considered short in certain stocks because of the
definition of short sales and because of bonafide arbitrage, risk arbi-
trage, or bonafide hedging. In determining whether a firm has a "net
long position" in a security for the purposes of the uptick rule, all
accounts of the firm must be aggregated. However, the definition of
a short sale, Rule 3b-3, only considers holdings in convertible secur-
ities, options, rights, and warrants as long positions if they have
been converted or exercised. Firms 'elling stock short, but also
fully hedged with economically equivalent securities, because of
42 Id.
43 Letter from Andrew Klein, on behalf of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith to
Richard Ketchum, Director, Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange
Commission (Oct. 2, 1986) (applying for exemption from Rule l0a-1 under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934) [hereinafter Letter from Andrew Klein].
44 Bonafide arbitrage, risk arbitrage, and bonafide hedging are defined in Securities
Transactions by Members of National Securities Exchanges, Exchange Act, Release No.
15,533, 44 Fed. Reg. 6084 (1979) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1).
45 Bona fide arbitrage occurs when market professionals make contemporaneous
purchases and sales of the same security in different markets or economically equivalent
instruments to profit from a pricing differential. Economically equivalent securities can
include stock, stock purchase warrants, options, and other convertible securities. Risk
arbitrage is risking capital on a contingent corporate event, for example, speculating on
the possibility of a merger or tender offer. Bonafide hedging is the offset of risk in a long
(short) position in a security with a contemporaneous short (long) transaction in an eco-
nomically equivalent security. See infra note 116 for a discussion of index arbitrage.
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bonafide arbitrage, risk arbitrage, or bonafide hedging may be consid-
ered short if some of the same securities that are included in the
index arbitrage position.
An example most easily demonstrates the problem. Suppose
Merrill Lynch has sold IBM stock short in bona fide arbitrage, and
therefore Merrill Lynch is long in an equal amount of economically
equivalent securities of IBM, for example, unexercised call options.
Suppose, also, the index arbitrage account is long in IBM stock.
When an index arbitrage opportunity arises requiring Merrill Lynch
to sell IBM, it must aggregate the long position in IBM in the index
arbitrage department with the definitionally short holdings of IBM
in the bona fide arbitrage account. This aggregation may result in
Merrill Lynch being considered short in the stock even though the
bonafide arbitrage account is fully hedged. Therefore, the index ar-
bitrage trade may be subjected to the tick test, hampering the ability
of Merrill Lynch to quickly sell IBM stock.46
In its letter, Merrill Lynch argued that the exemptions to the
uptick rule are based on one or more of three basic factors: 1) the
small possibility the practice could be used for market manipulation,
2) the lack of any incentive to use the practice to make manipulative
short sales, and 3) the need to prevent the uptick rule from interfer-
ing in an "unwarranted way" with actions that contribute to pricing
efficiency among and between markets. 47
Merrill Lynch argued that the latter two factors provided ajusti-
fication for granting an exemption from Rule 10a-1 for stock that is
1) long for an index arbitrage position; 2) sold as part of an un-
winding of index arbitrage; and 3) sold in a sale which would be
considered short because Merrill Lynch previously had sold the
stock short for hedging or arbitrage. Because the stock is fully
hedged in the other departments, there would be no incentive for
manipulative short selling, as the profits on short positions in stock
would be offset by losses in the equivalent securities. Further, index
arbitrage promotes pricing efficiency by linking the futures and the
cash markets. Finally, Merrill Lynch noted that this proposed ex-
emption is analogous to exemption (e)(13), which allows a block
positioner to ignore for the purposes of the tick test offsetting short
positions created in bona fide arbitrage, risk arbitrage, or bona fide
46 For example, suppose Merrill Lynch has sold 100 shares of IBM short in bonafide
arbitrage and has unexercised call options for 100 shares of IBM stock, and for index
arbitrage has purchased 100 shares of IBM stock. When Merrill Lynch wants to sell the
100 shares of IBM for index arbitrage, it would be considered a short sale because the
call options are not counted and because Merrill Lynch would be considered to not have
a long position in IBM (the 100 shares sold short offset the 100 shares).
47 See Letter from Andrew Klein, supra note 43, at 8.
810 [Vol. 74:799
19891 RESTRICTIONS ON SHORT SALES
hedging.48
The SEC received bitter criticism for the no-action letter after
the crash. Martin Mayer, for example, argued that an effective up-
tick rule helps keep computer trading from causing significant mar-
ket declines. Therefore, Mayer considered the SEC's relaxation of
the rule to be harmful to orderly markets and the investing public
and to be a major factor in the crash. The validity of this criticism
must ultimately rest on the economic effects of index arbitrage.49
III
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE SHORT SALE RESTRICTIONS
Short selling improves the efficiency of securities pricing and
increases liquidity. The investor who has asymmetric information
indicating a stock is overpriced can sell it short with the expectation
that the stock will be purchased in the future at a lower price. Inves-
tors can use short sales to arbitrage away price differences between
markets and between related securities. More recently, short selling
has become part of index arbitrage. Index arbitrage arises when the
difference between the price of a futures contract on an index and
the cash value of the underlying index becomes sufficiently large to
warrant arbitrage activity. Index arbitrage improves the efficiency of
security markets by moving prices toward their equilibrium level.
Arbitrage, by linking markets, thus increases liquidity. While
liquidity alludes a precise definition, Grossman and Miller suggest it
is closely related to the ability to trade immediately. 50 Increased li-
quidity improves market efficiency and facilitates hedging (taking
48 See Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-20,230, File No. S7-
995, 28 SEC Docket 1447 (Sept. 27, 1983) for a discussion of the block positioning
exemption.
49 Note also that contrary to Mayer's argument, which said: "In effect, this letter
exempts broker/dealer firms-only broker/dealer firms, but all of them-from the long-
standing uptick rule[,]" see Mayer, supra note 3, at 18, the no-action letter did not exempt
broker dealers from the uptick rule. Instead, it permitted under the uptick rule, sales of
stock pursuant to index arbitrage unwinding without aggregation with other fully
hedged positions. No new short positions were created and the firm would not benefit
from a price decline. It would only affect the sales of a few stocks that were traded both
in index arbitrage and in other hedging or arbitrage transactions. Finally, as a practical
matter the SEC found no evidence of reliance on this letter in index arbitrage on Octo-
ber 19, 1987. In a survey of the October 1987 trading of 13 brokerage firms, only one
firm quantified its reliance on the no-action position in index arbitrage trading (its main
unwinding transaction occurred on October 16). Other firms did not rely on the no-
action position or could not quantify their reliance. See DIVISION OF MARKET REGULA-
TION SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET
BREAK 3-26 n.68 (1988) (this study is commonly referred to as the "SEC Study of the
Market Break" but was actually conducted by the Division of Market Regulation and
does not represent the opinion of the SEC) [hereinafter MARKET BREAK STUDY].
50 See generally Grossman & Miller, Liquidity and Market Structure, 43 J. FIN. 617
(1988).
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opposite positions in similar assets), which reduces investor risk. In
addition to the indirect effect on hedgers through increased liquid-
ity, hedgers who wish to protect themselves against price declines
use short selling directly. In turn, hedging increases liquidity be-
cause reduction of risk enables traders and market makers to take
large positions. Finally, the ability of specialists to sell short helps
them maintain an orderly market during periods of large buy orders
without having to maintain a large costly inventory.-5
Notwithstanding its benefits, short selling is subject to more se-
vere regulation, 52 including higher margin requirements and the
uptick rule, than other security transactions. Federal margin regula-
tions require a short seller to deposit the net proceeds of a short
sale plus 50% of the proceeds in a margin account.53 Thus, a short
seller cannot access the funds raised in the short sale for use in
other investments. We concentrate here on the uptick rule and ask
whether this rule is necessary to protect individual securities and the
entire market from abusive short selling and market manipulation.
Some questions arise as to whether the evils that the uptick rule
was implemented to rectify ever presented a significant problem.
The perception in the 1930s was that short sales generally, and bear
raids specifically, contributed to the crash and continued with harm-
ful effects. However, only anecdotal evidence supports this view.
Conversely, Meeker reported in 1932 that there was no truth to the
rumor that bear raids had caused the 1929 panic. 54 He cited statis-
tics from the NYSE short interest inquiry of November 13, 1929 that
short interest on November 1, 1929 was a mere 1/8 of one percent
of the total NYSE market value. Meeker argued that, if anything,
insufficient short selling exacerbated the crash because short sellers
eventually become buyers as the market falls.
In 1951 the Twentieth Century Fund study of short selling
commissioned by the NYSE found, "in the twenty years since May
1931, there appears no conclusive statistical evidence that short sell-
ing materially affected the extent of a major decline or a major ad-
vance in the market as a whole." 55 The Twentieth Century Fund
51 Specialists' short sales were 46.2% of all short sales in 1987 and 41.6% of all
short sales in 1986. Specialists do not maintain a short position for long periods. The
NYSE reports that only a negligible share of short interest is held by specialists. NYSE
1988 FACT BooK, supra note 4, at 59.
52 For example, section 16(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits
short sales by certain statutorily defined insiders including beneficial owners, directors,
or officers. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1982).
53 See 12 C.F.R § 220 (1988); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982)).
54 SeeJ. MEEKER, supra note 8, at 125.
55 F. MACAULAY & D. DURAND, supra note 15, at ix.
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study also noted that a bear raider would face risks and that bear
raiding was not as attractive as others have claimed:
As he (bear raider) increased his short position, knowledge of
his activities might leak out to someone who was willing to take a
very large position on the long side of that particular stock-and
this new operator might buy the stock from the short seller as fast
as the short seller sold it; and as soon as the short seller showed
unmistakable signs of wanting to cover, the purchaser might begin
to bid up the price of the stock. The short seller could then find
himself in a most difficult situation-forced to cover his short po-
sition at a loss or even at ruinously high prices. Indeed, covering
might even have become quite impossible, if the purchasing oper-
ator had succeeded in buying enough stock.56
The SEC noted in 1976 that the 1937 SEC study of short selling
used to justify the uptick rule has been criticized on several
grounds, 57 most notably that the conclusions were drawn "from in-
adequate data and that the information released by the Commission
merely demonstrates trends over a short period of time-trends
which are inconclusive with respect to the general impact of short
selling."58
A. The Theoretical Impact of Short Sale Restrictions on the
Pricing of Individual Securities
Finance literature has addressed the impact of short sale restric-
tions on the price of individual securities. Edward Miller argues that
short sale restrictions inhibit trading by those with relatively pessi-
mistic views of a stock, and thus short sale restrictions result in an
upward bias in stock prices.59 Because optimists are relatively more
important in the determination of equilibrium prices in the presence
of short sale restrictions, the upward bias will be greater the larger
the dispersion in investors' views. However, RobertJarrow suggests
that the effect of short sale restrictions on prices is ambiguous. 60 He
argues that an investor's demand for one stock, while unaffected by
short-sale restrictions on that stock, also depends on short sale re-
strictions on other stocks. For example, suppose an investor is pes-
simistic about Ford but optimistic about IBM and she views her
optimal investment strategy as buying IBM and short selling Ford.
However, short-sale restrictions that keep the investor from short-
56 Id. at vii.
57 Short Sales of Securities, supra note 13, at 87,209.
58 Id.
59 See, e.g., Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32J. FIN. 1151 (1977).
60 Jarrow, Heterogenous Expectations, Restrictions on Short Sales, and Equilibrium Asset
Prices, 35J. FIN. 1105 (1980).
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selling Ford will affect the investor's overall strategy and the amount
of IBM that she buys.
Douglas Diamond and Robert Verrecchia add other considera-
tions in their model of the effect of short sale restrictions: the distri-
bution of security prices and the speed of price adjustment to the
release of news. 61 They formulate a rational expectations model of
trading where a specialist posts a bid-ask spread and traders incor-
porate and act on knowledge about the effects of short sale restric-
tions on other traders. The model incorporates the actions of
informed traders who have private information, uninformed traders
who have only public information and trade for liquidity reasons,
and the specialist who observes the trades but who does not have
private information. The specialist sets a bid-ask spread that on av-
erage equalizes his losses from trading with informed investors and
his gains from trading with uninformed investors. Short-sale re-
strictions increase the costs of short selling and thus reduce the
number of short sellers. Further, the restrictions have the greatest
effect on uninformed traders and on informed traders with only
slightly bad news. Short-sale restrictions, by increasing the ex-
pected return necessary to induce short selling, alter the mix of
short sellers: the higher the level of short-sale costs the more in-
formed are the traders that short sell. Therefore, restrictions on
short sales convey information, and specialists and traders consider
the informational content of short sales when making their trading
decisions.
Several implications follow from Diamond and Verrecchia's
model. They suggest that, while short sale restrictions eliminate
some trades, the restrictions do not bias stock prices upward in the
long run. However, short-sale restrictions generally reduce the
speed of price adjustment to both good and bad news, especially
bad news. 62 By reducing the knowledge the market has at any point
in time, short-sale restrictions increase the price reaction when pri-
vate news is made public and thus increase volatility. 63
61 See Diamond & Verrecchia, Constraints on Short Selling and Asset Price Adjustment to
Private Information, 18J. FIN. ECON. 277 (1987).
62 The speed of adjustment is reduced for all types of news because short-sale re-
strictions reduce the amount of information in the market. Specifically, by decreasing
the number of short sales, short sale restrictions increase the number of periods when
no trades take place. Therefore, the informational content of observing that no trades
take place in a period is reduced, lowering the speed of price adjustment. The largest
effect is on bad news since traders with bad news are directly affected by short-sale re-
strictions. Diamond and Verrecchia claim this is indirectly supported by empirical evi-
dence. Id. at 299 (citing Lloyd-Davies & Canes, Stock Prices and the Publication of Second-
Hand Information, 51 J. Bus. 43 (1978)). Lloyd-Davies and Canes find that an investment
analyst's clients are more likely to act on a buy rather than a sell recommendation.
63 The determinants of the effects of short sale restrictions in the model depend on
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B. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Short Sale Restrictions
Stephen Figlewski tests the effects of short sale restrictions by
comparing the excess returns earned by portfolios of stocks classi-
fied by their short interest.64 Figlewski, based on Miller's argu-
ments, hypothesizes that if short sale restrictions cause the market
to exclude unfavorable information, then the higher the short inter-
est (uncovered short sales) of a stock, the more likely unfavorable
information about that stock has been excluded and hence the more
overpriced the stock. He predicts that portfolios of high short inter-
est stocks should underperform portfolios of low short interest
stocks. In support of his theory, Figlewski finds that the low short
interest portfolios earned greater excess returns than high short in-
terest portfolios. 65 His results support the view that short sale re-
strictions, including the uptick rule, bias stock prices upward.
In contrast, two papers by Jennifer Conrad present evidence
more consistent with the work of Diamond and Verrecchia. In the
first paper, Conrad examines the stock price reaction to the intro-
duction of options for 96 stock options between 1973 and 1980.66
Since options can be used by investors who believe a stock is over-
priced, the introduction of options may have the similar effects to
reducing short sale restrictions.6 7 The introduction of options may
improve the efficiency of markets by allowing trading by traders pre-
viously restricted by short sale restrictions, which in turn may im-
prove the efficiency of the pricing of securities. If true, Conrad
notes we would expect that stock prices would increase upon the
introduction of options.6 8 On the other hand the introduction of
the relative importance of two effects. Informational efficiency is reduced when the re-
strictions drive out informed traders, and informational efficiency is enhanced when the
restrictions drive out uninformed traders. Diamond and Verrecchia argue that the usual
effect of short sale restrictions is to reduce the speed of price adjustment, especially for
bad news since some traders with bad private information will not short sell. Id. at 298.
64 See, e.g., Figlewski, The Informational Effects of Restrictions on Short Sales: Some Empiri-
cal Evidence, 16J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 463 (1981).
65 Id. at 473-74. This result appears somewhat surprising, since it implies a profita-
ble trading rule that has not been arbitraged away. Id. at 473. However, the results do
not include estimates of transactions costs to test whether there actually is a profitable
trading rule.
66 Conrad, The Price Effect of Option Introduction, 44J. FIN. 487 (1989).
67 One commentator notes, "[a]n investor can largely replicate a short sale by si-
multaneously buying the put, selling the call, and borrowing the present value of the
exercise price." Brealey, How to Combine Active Management with Index Funds, 12J. PORTFO-
LIO MGrr. 4 (Winter 1986). The transaction presented by Brealey will only be strictly
equivalent to a short sale if the options were European options.
68 Conrad notes, however, that welfare improvements do not always lead to price
increases in the financial markets. However, a price increase in the financial market
would indicate an increase in welfare (citing Hakansson, Changes in the Financial Market:
Welfare and Price Effects and the Basic Theorems of Value Conservation, 37 J. FIN. 977 (1982)).
Conrad, supra note 66, at 493.
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options could reduce stock prices if it allows investors with more
negative information to trade. Also, the possibility exists that the
introduction of options could decrease the price of the underlying
security if the option introduction increased the possibility of a bear
raid or the volatility of returns.
Conrad finds that the introduction of options is associated with
a positive stock price increase. 69 Since options can be used to imi-
tate short sales, Conrad's evidence does not support the hypothesis
that short-sale restrictions bias stock prices upward. 70 She also finds
that the introduction of options decreases the volatility of prices of
the underlying equity security (variance of returns), and further-
more, the introduction of options does not affect the individual
stocks' systematic risk, as measured by the stocks' betas.
In her second paper, Conrad performs a more direct test of
whether traders incorporate available short selling information in
their trading. 7' She examines the excess stock price returns around
the monthly Wall Street Journal short interest announcement using a
technique that distinguishes between informed short selling and un-
informed (specialist) short selling. She finds that for short interest
announcements there is a negative effect in regard to the unex-
pected informed component of short interest, and an insignificant
positive effect exists from uninformed short interest. Conrad claims
these results indicate that investors incorporate into their decisions
others' negative private information, and that the market distin-
guishes between informed and uninformed short sales. 72 Combined
with her evidence on option introductions this evidence on short
interest indicates that at least some pessimistic information is incor-
porated into stock prices despite short-selling restrictions. 73 She
69 There was no stock price reaction to the subsequent introduction of put options
on 36 of the stocks, where put options were introduced after the call options. Until 1980
put options on individual stocks were introduced after the call options had been intro-
duced. Therefore, for most of the stocks in the main sample of option introductions, the
introduction of option trading meant the introduction of call option trading. Id.
70 The positive price effect could also arise if option introduction does not remove
short sales constraints.
71 J. CONRAD, THE PRICE EFFECT OF SHORT INTEREST ANNOUNCEMENTS (University of
North Carolina, Working Paper, October 1987).
72 Id.
73 Other evidence exists on the relationship between short sales and stock price
movements. Two papers test whether the aggregate specialists' short sale ratio (ratio of
short sales made by specialists on the NYSE to all short sales) predicts future stock price
movements in a way that can be profitably exploited by investors. Unlike the Conrad
work, these papers are based on the hypothesis that, at least at the aggregate level, spe-
cialists have superior information about market movements. Under the assumption that
specialists have superior information about the market in general and short sales result
from unfavorable information, then when the specialist short sale ratio increases stock
prices would be expected to decline (and vice versa). Reilly & Whitford, A Test of the
Specialists' Short Sale Ratio, 8J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 12 (1982) find that while specialists may
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states, however, that short selling restrictions may still affect the effi-
ciency of price adjustments to negative information.
C. Block Trading
While we argue that the uptick rule reduces market efficiency in
general, certain groups potentially benefit from the rule. Firms
listed on the major exchanges represent one group potentially
harmed by a relaxation in the rule.74 Firms generally would like to
reduce the incentives for traders to release negative information, es-
pecially bad rumors, about their firms' prospects. However, the up-
tick rule does not stop all short selling; it just slows the process
slightly. Traders with negative information still have incentives to
short sell and release negative information. Furthermore, relatively
small firms traded over the counter have a greater incentive to favor
the uptick rule because their stock prices are more likely to be sensi-
tive to unsubstantiated rumors. Only for thinly traded stocks is
there a remote possibility of manipulative short sellers stampeding
the price down.
Another group may be interested in retaining the rule-block
traders and block positioners. Block trades are large trades, usually
made by institutional investors. Institutional investors trade large
be able to earn superior returns, investors trading on the specialists' short sale ratio can
not earn excess returns. But see Bowlin & Rozeff, Do Specialists' Short Sales Predict Returns?,
13 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 59 (1987). Using a different estimation technique, their study
concludes that specialists successfully predict future market performance and that trad-
ing on the specialists' short sale ratio would have earned excess returns. They do not
show, however, that a trading rule could have led to excess returns after accounting for
transactions costs.
John G. McDonald and Donald Baron examined risk and return on a sample of 100
NYSE listed firms from 1961 and 1966. They find no evidence that short sellers were
able to earn abnormal returns and that there was a direct relationship between risk and
short interest. They conclude the evidence suggests that short selling is more important
for hedging purposes than for speculative short-sellers. McDonald & Baron, Risk and
Return on Short Positions in Common Stock, 28J. FIN. 97 (1973). More recent evidence con-
sistent with McDonald and Baron is contained in J. WOOLRIDGE & C. GHOSH, AN Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF SHORT SELLING AND SECURITY PRICES (Penn State University
Working Paper 1987). Woolridge and Ghosh perform several empirical tests on a sam-
ple of 50 AMEX firms. They find that monthly changes in short positions are positively
related to monthly stock returns, indicating that on average short sellers were shorting
into rising prices. They also find that stocks with higher and more variable short interest
positions have higher betas and find no evidence that short sellers have earned abnor-
mal returns (and thus no support for the view that short sellers manipulate prices to
earn excess returns).
74 One comment letter sent to the SEC on the 1976 proposal to relax the uptick
rule came from a listed firm. The Vice President of AT&T opposed the elimination of
the tick test arguing that theoretical improvements in market efficiency were not suffi-
cient to outweigh the increased risk and volatility. AT&T was especially opposed to the
proposals to eliminate the tick test for some securities (including AT&T), arguing it
would be unfair to the issuers and shareholders of those firms. Letter from William G.
Burns to George A. Fitzsimmons (May 3, 1977).
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blocks both for liquidity and informational reasons. 75 While block
trades make up a relatively small portion of the NYSE trades (4% in
1987) they comprise over half of the total volume (51.2% in
1987).76 The NYSE reports that in 1987 the exchange averaged
3639 block trades a day.7 7 The importance of block trades has risen
with the growth of institutional trading. As late as 1965 the NYSE
averaged only 9 block trades a day (3.1% of volume), but by 1975
the average had increased to 136 a day (16.6% of volume) and by
1980 the average was 528 a day (29.2% of volume). 78 Jarrell docu-
ments the importance of institutional investors in regulations and
actions of the NYSE and the SEC, and shows that the increasing
importance of institutional investors caused deregulation of certain
anticompetitive practices on the NYSE during 1968 to 1975.7 9
When a investor wants to make a block trade, he first contacts a
block trader at a securities firm that belongs to the exchange on
which he plans to trade.80 The trading price is negotiated, and in-
cludes factors such as the price of the block, the commission, how
the commission will be paid, and how quickly the transaction should
be consummated.8 ' The seller (buyer) of the block can give the
block trader time to test the market, or they can agree on an imme-
diate sale (buy) to the broker, who becomes a block positioner. Fre-
quently, when the broker acts as a block positioner, the difference
between the price paid by the block positioner and the price he re-
ceives for the block represents his compensation. Block positioners
usually only buy blocks and do not short sell for block purchase
orders.82
75 The New York State Exchange Rule 127.10 defines a block as follows:
[A]t least 10,000 shares or a quantity of stock having a market value of
$200,000 or more, whichever is less, which is acquired by a member or-
ganization on its own behalf and/or for others from one or more buyers
or sellers in a single transaction.
Rules of Board-Handling of Orders & Reports, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2127.10 (Jan.
1989).
76 See NYSE FACT BOOK, supra note 4, at 11, 13, & 75.
77 Id. at 13.
78 Id. at 75.
79 See Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J. L. &
ECON. 273 (1984).
80 Descriptions of the process of block trades are provided in T. COPELAND & J.
WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY 370 (3d ed. 1988); K. GARBADE,
SECURITIES MARKETS 256 (1982); R. SCHWARTZ, EQUITY MARKETS STRUCTURE, TRADING,
AND PERFORMANCE 106 (1988); Holthausen, Leftwich & Mayers, The Effect of Large Block
Transactions on Security Prices: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1987).
81 The compensation can be paid to the broker in several ways. A broker is paid a
commission. In addition, when the broker acts as a block positioner the selling price of
the block to the broker is adjusted to compensate the broker.
82 See Holthausen, Leftwich & Mayers, supra note 80, at 265; R. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 80, at 107.
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Whether the block trader is trading for himself or a customer,
he must contact institutional investors and other block traders to
shop the block. A block trade cannot just be sent to the floor of the
exchange because it is unlikely there would be enough traders to
take the opposite side of the exchange. The block trader must be
careful, however, to limit the spread of information about the im-
pending trade because when information about an impending block
trade reaches the market it can affect the price of the stock and thus
be costly to the block trader.
Theoretically, several reasons explain a block transaction's ef-
fect on the stock price. Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers list three
possible explanations for price changes associated with block trans-
actions-liquidity costs, inelastic demand curves, and information
effects.8 3 Liquidity costs arise because of the difficulty of identifying
potential buyers (sellers) of the block. The demand curve is inelas-
tic when there are insufficient close substitutes for the firm's stock.
Information effects on stock prices occur when the block transaction
conveys information about the firm's prospects, or traders believe
the trade contains information.8 4
Empirical evidence confirms that block transactions do affect
stock prices. In some cases the effect on stock prices is temporary,
such as the short run price movement after an informationless trade,
while in other situations, such as when the trade conveys informa-
tion, the stock price effect is permanent.85 . Holthausen, Leftwich,
and Mayers contains the most recent evidence on the price effects of
block trades. 86 They classify block trades as seller initiated if they
trade on a downtick and buyer initiated if they trade on an uptick
and test whether any price effects are permanent or temporary and
if they vary with block size. They find that for seller-initiated trans-
actions, a negative total price effect results that increases with the
size of the block. Their evidence suggests, however, that most of
this price effect is temporary.8 7 For buyer-initiated transactions,
83 Holthausen, Leftwich & Mayers, supra note 80, at 239.
84 Informationless trades such as portfolio insurance sales will not permanently af-
fect stock prices. Therefore, there are calls for those making portfolio insurance trades
to announce the trades in advance so that the price is not disrupted.
85 For evidence on the price effects of block transactions, see generally Holthausen,
Leftwich & Mayers, supra note 80; Kraus & Stoll, Price Impacts of Block Trading on the New
York Stock Exchange, 27J. FIN. 569 (1972); Mikkelson & Partch, Stock Price Effects and Costs
of Secondary Distributions, 14J. FIN. ECON. 165 (1985); Scholes, The Market for Securities:
Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179
(1972).
86 Holthausen, Leftwich & Mayers, supra note 80.
87 An earlier study testing a trading rule based on block transactions finds that
prices 15 minutes after the execution of a block trade are unbiased estimates of closing
prices on that day, indicating that prices completely adjust within 15 minutes after a
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Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers find a permanent price effect re-
sults that increases with block size, but little evidence of temporary
price effects. 88
Because block sales depress stock lrices, the uptick rule can
help protect block traders and block positioners from actions of
market professionals. If market professionals learn about a pending
block sale before its execution, they could sell the stock short, re-
ducing the price the block trader/block positioner receives for the
stock.89 In certain cases the uptick rule protects the "property right
in knowledge" about a pending block sale. 90 The uptick rule limits
the ability of market professionals to sell short since each must wait
for an uptick to do so. 91 However, the uptick rule provides very
inefficient protection of the property right of block traders. The
rule only helps block sellers from the actions of market profession-
als who are not long in the stock. The rule does not protect block
buyers at all. In addition, the growth of the option market and in-
ternational trading further reduce the ability of the uptick rule to
insulate block trades from market professionals.
D. Summary of Economic Evidence
The argument that short-sellers manipulate markets to make a
profit on declining prices is without theoretical and empirical sup-
port. Economic evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the stock
market efficiently incorporates information about a firm's future in-
block trade. Dann, Mayers & Raab, Trading Rules, Large Blocks, and the Speed of Price Adjust-
ment, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1977).
88 Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers suggest that temporary price effects are a
function of liquidity costs, while permanent price effects are due to information. There-
fore, they interpret their results that there are temporary effects of block sales but not
purchases as consistent with two pieces of "street wisdom." First, the liquidity cost ra-
tionale for temporary price effects is more important for block sales than block
purchases and second, block positioners will inventory stock if it is a block sale but do
not usually sell short to facilitate a block purchase. See Holthausen, Leftwich & Mayers,
supra note 80, at 264.
89 This argument that block traders and block positioners would be harmed by re-
laxation of the uptick rule is made in many of the comment letters to the Securities and
Exchange Commissions's 1976 proposal to eliminate the uptick rule. See Exchange Act
Release No. 13,091, supra note 13. For example, letters from The New York Stock Ex-
change and The Securities Industry Association make this point.
90 New York Stock Exchange Rule 97 puts restrictions on further purchases by
block positioners once they have acquired a block. This restricts block positioners from
engaging in purchases to increase the price before it sells the block.
91 The letter by the Securities Industry Association pursuant to the SEC's proposed
relaxation of the uptick rule hypothesizes that the reason block positioners rarely short
sell blocks to customers who want to buy a block and that institutions rarely "aggres-
sively seek to purchase such blocks" is because market professionals would use knowl-
edge of a pending block purchase to buy stock, driving up the price. Letter from
Edward I. O'Brien to George A. Fitzsimmons (Apr. 15, 1977).
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come stream into its stock price.92 Profit motives of investors move
security prices quickly to their equilibrium level, making it impossi-
ble to consistently "fool" investors in ways that would be necessary
for individuals to manipulate the market and profit from falling
stock prices. 93 Far from destroying the efficiency of markets
through manipulation, short-sellers may enhance market efficiency
by expediting the downward movement in prices to their equilib-
rium level. 94
Even if market manipulation by short sellers posed a real threat,
the present form of the uptick rule provides an inappropriate rem-
edy. Bear raids, in which short sellers spread false negative rumors
about a firm, are not likely to be effective for stocks traded on the
major exchanges. Market professionals closely analyze and watch
these stocks. In a short period of time a great deal of information is
available to investors about these stocks; market professionals are
not prone to be fooled by false rumors. 95 Bear raids succeed more
often in thinly traded OTC stocks. Not as much public information
92 See Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FiN.
383 (1970) for the seminal review article. According to Professor Michael Jensen of
Harvard University, "[There is no other proposition in economics which has more solid
empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis." Jensen, Some
Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6J. FIN. ECON. 95 (1978).
93 In an efficient market, a security's price will be a good estimater of its invest-
ment value-that is, the present value of its future prospects as estimated
by well-informed and clever analysts. Any substantial disparity between
price and value would reflect market inefficiency. In a well-developed
and free market, major inefficiencies are rare. The reason is not hard to
find. Major disparities between price and investment value will be noted
by alert analysts, who will seek to take advantage of their discoveries.
W. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 68 (3d ed. 1985).
94 This ignores short sellers who trade on insider information. However, laws
against insider trading are the appropriate way to deal with such investors, not the im-
pairment of liquidity through the restrictions on short sales.
95 There is no systematic evidence that supports the notion that false rumors dam-
age a company's reputation. The market is extremely proficient at distinguishing ru-
mors from true information. Consider airline crashes. Following a crash, there is much
speculation about which party is at fault; in most cases, the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) does not assign responsibility until several months afterwards. While many
rumors immediately abound following a crash as to which party is at fault, recent evi-
dence by Mitchell & Maloney, Crisis in the Cockpit? The Role of Market Forces in PromotingAir
Travel Safety, 32 J.L. & EcON. 329 (1989) indicates that false rumors do not fool market
professionals. Their study finds that during the immediate wake of the crash, the stock
market devalues the stock prices for those airlines to be judged at fault months later by
the FAA, but for those airlines judged not to be at fault, no stock price decline exists in
the immediate wake of the crash. It is highly unlikely therefore that a manipulative in-
vestor could spread false rumors, sell short, and drive the stock price down for an airline
following a crash not the fault of the airline.
More specifically, a masters thesis by Cynthia A. Brown, "A Financial Market Analy-
sis of Managerial Decision Making at Proctor & Gamble: Product Line Diversification
and Logo Removal," Clemson University, 1986, examines the impact that false rumors
can have on a company's stock price in an examination of continual rumors during the
early 1980s' linking Proctor & Gamble's "man in the moon" logo with Satanism. She
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exists about these firms and investors could more probably be stam-
peded into selling by false information. 96 For these smaller infre-
quently traded, firms outliers in analysts' forecasts could bias stock
prices.97 However, the uptick rule does not apply to OTC stocks. If
regulators were really worried about market efficiency and bear
raids, they would consider eliminating the uptick rule from ex-
change traded stocks and applying it to OTC stocks.
IV
THE UPTICK RULE, PROGRAM TRADING, AND THEIR IMPACT
ON THE 1987 STOCK MARKET CRASH
A. Background
Certain trading strategies, such as index arbitrage and portfolio
insurance-commonly called program trading-have fallen under
intense criticism since the October 19, 1987 market crash. Both the
Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms 98 and
the Division of Market Regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission 99 have cited program trading as exacerbating the mar-
ket decline on October 14-16 and the subsequent crash on October
19. These reports suggest that program trading worsened the de-
cline begun by fundamental factors.' 00 Calls for restrictions on pro-
finds little evidence that the false rumors had a negative impact on Proctor & Gamble's
stock price.
96 Joe Feshbach, a partner in a firm that does short selling, states: "The whole bear
raid thing is a joke unless there's a lot of stock owned on margin and you're able to
pressure a margin call." See Crossen, Program Traders Find an Unlikely Ally in Bid to Abolish
'Uptick Rule' on the Big Board, Heard on the Street, Wall StreetJournal, January 11, 1988,
at 53, col. 3.
97 To this extent small firms have incentive to release all information to reduce the
dispersion in their stock price. See generally Verrecchia, On the Theory of Market Information
and Efficiency, 1 J. Acc. & ECON. 77 (1979).
98 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (1988) (com-
monly referred to as the "Brady Commission Report").
99 MARKET BREAK STUDY, supra note 49.
100 The alleged harmful effects of program trading at the time of the crash are dis-
puted in the studies conducted by the Division of Economic Analysis and the Division of
Trading and Markets of the United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Final Report on Stock Index Futures and Cash Market Activity During October 1987 to the United
States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, (January 1988) and the Report of the Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange (1988).
The fundamental factors that are purported to have triggered the crash include a
higher than expected trade deficit, rising interest rates, increased worries about the gov-
ernment deficit, and changes in the tax treatments of takeovers proposed by the House
Ways and Means Committee. Mark Mitchell and Jeffry Netter argue that the major fac-
tor triggering the market decline that turned into the crash was the proposed restric-
tions on favorable tax treatments of takeovers introduced by the House Ways and Means
Committee the week before the crash. Mitchell & Netter, Triggering the 1987 Stock Market
Crash: Antitakeover Provisions in the Proposed House Ways and Means Tax Bill?, 23 J. FIN.
ECON. no. 1 (1989) (forthcoming).
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gram trading strategies and the derivative products that make them
possible abound in Congress and the popular press.
The calls for restrictions on program trading and derivative
products extend to the uptick rule because the uptick rule plays an
important role in one type of program trading-index arbitrage.
Consequently, calls for restrictions on index arbitrage often involve
strengthening the uptick rule. Therefore, we examine the effects of
both types of program trading most cited as causes of the crash-
index arbitrage and portfolio insurance-and discuss the relation-
ship of the uptick rule to these strategies.
Program trading involves the trading of a portfolio of stocks in
a single transaction. While program trading frequently employs
computers-particularly the NYSE's Designated Order Turnaround
(DOT) system which allows a trader to send orders to many trading
posts simultaneously-it does not require their use. Rather, pro-
gram trading simply represents a trading technique that in certain
instances facilitates investment strategies. Index arbitrage and port-
folio insurance are two such trading strategies. Both of these strate-
gies have been blamed as causes of the market crash.
In the early 1980s, largely in response to the increase in the
relative importance of institutional investors, a rapidly growing mar-
ket arose in stock index futures contracts. While several market in-
dexes exist on which futures contracts are traded, including the New
York Stock Exchange Index, the Major Market Index, and the Value
Line Index, for ease of exposition we will phrase our discussion in
terms of the most well-known index-the S&P 500 Index. The S&P
500 Index is a market-value weighted index of 500 selected firms,
most of which are traded on the NYSE. 10 ' The cumulative market
value of the S&P 500 represents approximately 80 percent of the
market value of the NYSE. The value of the index changes when the
price of the stocks comprising the index changes. The S&P 500 fu-
tures contract is traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and
represents the purchase or sale of the 500 stocks in the S&P 500,
based on the weights in the index, at a specified expiration date.
The existence of index futures contracts has lowered the cost of
certain types of portfolio trading and has provided benefits to inves-
tors in general-especially institutional investors. Trading a broad-
based market index enables institutional investors to hedge against
market risk as part of their investment strategy. When the costs of
hedging are reduced, institutional investors are able to assume
larger positions, which in turn benefits all investors by enhancing
101 The weights are assigned based on the market value of the stock.. See R. KOLB,
UNDERSTANDING FUTURES MARKETS (2d ed. 1988) (more complete discussion of the con-
struction of the S&P 500 Index and index futures contract).
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liquidity in the markets. Index futures benefit institutional investors
directly because the cost of trading index futures is far less than the
cost of trading the underlying stocks. Hans Stoll reports that the
costs of trading a $120 million portfolio of S&P 500 Index stocks is
0.48 percent while the estimated cost of trading a S&P 500 Index
futures on the same amount of stock is 0.025 percent.10 2
The index futures market also serves as a price discovery mar-
ket. The Report of the Division of Market Regulation of the SEC
states that lower transactions costs, lower margins, and high levels
of liquidity "have made the futures market the 'market of choice' for
many active institutional traders."103 Empirical evidence developed
by financial economists shows that the futures market incorporates
news more quickly than the equity market. Kawaller, Koch, and
Koch examine the intraday price relationship between the S&P 500
futures and S&P 500 Index and find that futures price movements
lead index movements by 20 to 45 minutes, while index movements
rarely affect futures beyond one minute.' 04 Harris examines trading
from October 12, 1987 to October 23, 1987 (including the October
19 crash) on each S&P 500 stock and for the December, 1987 S&P
500 futures contract and also finds that futures strongly lead the un-
derlying cash market. 10 5
The pricing of the S&P 500 Index future contract can be
thought of as the cost of carrying the underlying stocks until the
expiration of the contract, since at expiration the cash price of the
index and the price of the futures must be equal. The costs of carry-
ing the stocks depend on the riskless rate of interest and the divi-
dends paid on the stocks. Stoll reports the relationship between the
stock index futures price (F) and the cash price of the index (S) is:
(F-S)/S = r - d, where r is the riskless interest rate and d is the
dividend yield. 10 6
The existence of the index futures contract gives rise to an arbi-
trage opportunity when the price of the futures contract and the
cash price of the underlying index diverge by more than transac-
tions costs.' 0 7 Index arbitrage provides a trading strategy of buying
(selling) stocks in an index and selling (buying) the futures contract
102 Stoll, Portfolio Trading, 14J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 20, 21 (1988).
103 See Letter from Andrew Klein, supra note 43, at 3-6.
104 Kawaller, Koch & Koch, The Temporal Price Relationship between S&P 500 Futures and
the S&P 500 Index, 42 J. FIN. 1309 (1987).
105 Harris, The October 1987 S&P 500 Stock-Futures Basis, 44J. FIN. 77 (1989).
106 Stoll, supra note 102, at 21. See also Furbush, Program Trading and Price Movtsnent:
Evidence From the 1987 Market Crash, 18 FIN. MGMT. 68 (1989); Kawaller, Koch & Koch,
supra note 104, and R. KOLB, supra note 101, for discussions of the relationship between
the index futures price and the cash index price.
107 Transactions costs include commissions and costs associated with the bid-ask
spread.
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for that index when stock prices in the index are low (high) relative
to the futures price. The arbitrager can earn a "risk free" return
above the market risk free interest rate, if she can react quickly
enough to the arbitrage opportunity.
Index arbitrage promotes efficient pricing in both the cash and
futures markets. By eliminating the spread between the cash price
of the stock index and the futures price, index arbitrage transmits
changes in market prices from one market to the other. This infor-
mation transmission increases the value of the futures market as a
hedge against market movements. Index arbitrage does not
destabilize the markets but instead occurs contemporaneously with
the markets' reaction to some event that has changed the underlying
value of securities. As Fama states, index arbitrage is a stabilizing
force; "By linking stock and futures prices, index arbitrage should
reduce the noise in the combined signals from the two markets."108
The other type of program trading most cited as a cause of the
crash is portfolio insurance. 10 9 Portfolio insurance represents a
trading strategy that attempts to change the payoff pattern of a port-
folio of risky assets by allowing the value of the portfolio to increase
if the market rises, while not allowing its value to fall below a certain
level in the event of a market decline."I0 Portfolio insurance tech-
niques attempt to give the insured the ability to sell a portfolio at a
fixed price (long put option). Furbush notes investors could
purchase perfect portfolio insurance if there were liquid markets
available "in European payout-protected puts on market indexes
with appropriate striking prices and maturity." ''  Since such mar-
kets do not exist, investors use put options on stock indexes, which
directly creates long put protection, or use a dynamic trading strat-
egy to synthesize a put option. Dynamic strategies include "dy-
namic hedging with stocks and riskless assets such as Treasury Bills
or dynamic hedging with futures on the stock index and Treasury
Bills."' 12
Portfolio insurance that uses dynamic hedging can be destabliz-
ing because the trades reinforce market movements, although the
effects and the mechanism depend on the type of portfolio insur-
ance. Hill and Jones discuss the different effects of various types of
108 E. Fama, Perspectives on October 1987 or What Did We Learn from the Crash? in BLACK
MONDAY AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 78 (R. Kamphuis,Jr., R. Kormendi &J.
Watson, ed. 1989).
109 See Harris, The Dangers of Regulatory Oversight to the October 1987 Crash, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 927 (1989).
110 The cost of portfolio insurance is that an "insured" portfolio will not increase in
value as much as a comparable "uninsured" portfolio if the market increases.
III Furbush, supra note 106, at 70.
112 Id.
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portfolio insurance (and other program trading) on the market. 113
They note that in portfolio insurance implemented through options,
the only market effect occurs when the option is purchased, since
the insured does not need any later adjustments. However, in dy-
namic strategies the insured will vary the size of the positions in the
instruments in the same way as the market movement, which can be
destabilizing. For example, after the market falls, a portfolio insur-
ance strategy using stock index futures will call for a sale of futures
and for a freeze in stock market transactions. Such sales exert
downward pressure on the futures market and will tend to make fu-
tures cheap relative to cash. Index arbitragers will sell stock and
buy futures, thereby driving the stock market down further. Portfo-
lio insurance that uses stocks requires investors to sell stock after
the market falls and buy stock after a market increase. These move-
ments will be transmitted to the futures market by arbitragers.
Grossman also argues that portfolio insurance that uses syn-
thetic options adds to volatility more than portfolio insurance using
a put option on a stock index."14 Grossman suggests that when
traders use dynamic strategies to synthesize options instead of real
put options, the market loses valuable information on the extent of
portfolio insurance in the market. Therefore, market participants
do not have enough information about the future price volatility of
present dynamic hedging strategies which reduces liquidity and in-
creases volatility. Grossman also notes that government imposed
position limits on options reduce the attractiveness of put options
for large portfolios,' 15 and cause portfolio insurers to substitute the
synthetic options, which increases volatility." 16
Commentators examining the destabilizing effect of portfolio
insurance and the transmittal effect of index arbitrage have sug-
gested that program trading is destabilizing. Portfolio insurance
does add some destabilizing element to the market. However, value
traders who take the other side of portfolio insurance transactions
minimize this destabilizing effect. Portfolio insurance trades are in-
formationless because the trades are not based on new information
113 See Hill & Jones, Equity Trading, Program Trading, Portfolio Insurance, Computer Trad-
ing and All That, 44 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 29 (1988).
114 Grossman, An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Futures Price Volatility of Pro-
gram Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies, 61 J. Bus. 275 (1988); Grossman, Insurance
Seen and Unseen: The Impact on Markets, 14 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 5 (1988).
115 One commentator argues that option position limits contribute to market insta-
bility by essentially barring institutional investors from the options market increasing
transaction costs and impairing market efficiency. See Gastineau, The Time Has Come to
Limit Option Position Limits, 44 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 7 (1988).
116 A trading strategy of buying (selling) stocks in an index and selling (buying) the
futures contract for that index when stock prices in the index are low (high) relative to
their fair value with the futures price.
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about the underlying values of equities. Therefore, value traders-
those traders who are trading on the underlying value of securi-
ties-are willing to take the opposite side of a portfolio insurance
trade when the portfolio insurance trade moves the price. Eventu-
ally, there should be no price impact of a portfolio insurance trade.
B. Effects of the Uptick Rule
The trading of index futures increases market efficiency and li-
quidity by allowing investors to hedge market risk more cheaply
than directly through equities. Index arbitrage arises in response to
a divergence in the prices of the cash and futures markets and effec-
tively links the markets. However, the uptick rule hinders the ability
of traders to engage in index arbitrage since traders engaging in
index arbitrage must be able to react very quickly to differences be-
tween the futures and the cash price. If futures are trading at a dis-
count to cash, the arbitrager buys index futures and sells the basket
of stocks underlying the futures contract. But because of the uptick
rule, the arbitrager must wait for an uptick to sell short those stocks
which she does not hold." 7 As risk arbitrage becomes more costly,
investors refrain from using it yet, without risk arbitrage, the mar-
kets are more likely to become unlinked. This can have critical ef-
fects in turbulent conditions such as those which prevailed on
October 19, 1987.118
Another effect of the uptick rule on index arbitrage, in specific,
and portfolio trades in general, is that the ability to make such
trades is biased against smaller broker/dealers. Large bro-
ker/dealers can more easily afford the costs of holding portfolios
encompassing large numbers of stocks than smaller firms-in large
part because they hold stock for many reasons. Therefore, when
index arbitrage (or any portfolio strategy) calls for selling baskets of
stocks quickly, the firm long in most or all of the stocks can sell with
less risk since they would not have to wait for upticks.
Index arbitragers can become long in stock to bypass the con-
straints of the uptick rule, but it is costly. If an arbitrager has run
out of its long position in stocks and reads market sentiment that a
117 The arbitrager may choose to not trade some stocks underlying the index, but
this increases the risk of the arbitrage transaction. See Report of the New York Stock
Exchange, supra note 32, at 12 (recognizing the effect of the uptick rule in restricting
index arbitrage sell programs). It states:
To take advantage of this arbitrage opportunity, the arbitrager would
have to sell stock, and if he did not own the stock as an investment, he
would have to sell short... Since Securities Exchange Act Rule lOa-I
prohibits the short sale of stock on a 'down tick' ... an arbitrage which
requires a short sale is more difficult to implement.
1 18 See Grossman & Miller, supra note 50 (arguing that restrictions on arbitrage at the
time of the crash, unlinked markets, decreased liquidity, and exacerbated the decline).
1989] 827
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
equity-sell program may become appropriate she can engage in an
Exchange for Physical (EFP) on a foreign market, usually
London.' 19 In a typical EFP transaction, which for an NYSE mem-
ber must occur when the NYSE is closed to avoid violating NYSE
rules,120 an arbitrager goes to another party (frequently a customer)
in London and offers to buy a basket of stocks for a futures contract.
The arbitrager offers terms for the agreement such that the party
selling the stock will earn greater than the risk free interest rate in a
risk free transaction (risk free because the equities are hedged by
the futures). If the party selling the stock to the index arbitrager
does not have the stock, he will short sell the stock in London. 21
The arbitrager is now long in the stock and prepared to sell if such
an index arbitrage opportunity arises and the other party can cover
the short sale later.
While EFPs facilitate index arbitrage, they are not without
costs. First, the terms of the EFP are set to be attractive to the arbi-
trager's trading partner, so the arbitrager is paying a price to avoid
the uptick rule. In addition, since EFPs must take place when the
NYSE is closed, they are not feasible for an immediate reaction dur-
ing NYSE trading hours when an arbitrager faces a sell stock situa-
tion and she is short in certain stocks. 122
Portfolio insurance is not as directly affected by the uptick rule
as index arbitrage. Portfolio insurance does not rely on the sort of
immediate reactions hindered by the uptick rule. For example,
portfolio insurance adjustments are frequently made overnight
based on closing prices. 123 However, increased efficiency of trading
mechanisms will increase the speed that traders wish to execute
portfolio insurance trades in the future. In addition, the interaction
119 For a description of EFPs, see Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Divi-
sion of Trading and Markets; Report on Exchanges of Futures for Physicals (Oct. 1,
1987). The SEC report states "a significant amount of index-related trading on October
14 to 16 was effected off the NYSE, primarily in the London market as exchanges-for-
physicals ('EFPs')." MARKET BREAK STUDY, supra note 49, at 2-10.
120 New York Stock Exchange Rule 390, the market responsibility rule, affects such
transactions. In the Supplementary Material to Rule 390-Interpretations of the Market
Responsibility Rule-it says in part "any member ... may . . . outside of Exchange
trading hours, may trade as principal or agent in any listed stock in a foreign country
over-the-counter." Id.
121 There is no uptick rule in London.
122 Avoiding the uptick rule is not the only reason firms would engage in portfolio
transactions in London. George Anders and Craig Forman report that program trades
are more frequently being made in London. The extra time for portfolio trading to
match buyers and sellers for large portfolios means that there is less market impact
when the market learns of the trade. The article quotes a NYSE report that in a recent
period 17% of program trading in U.S. stocks was done overseas, mainly in London.
Anders & Forman, Program Trades are Now Using the London Route, Wall St. J., Sept. 21,
1988, at 4, col. 1.
123 See Hill & Jones, supra note 113, at 36.
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of portfolio insurance and index arbitrage does involve the uptick
rule, especially in crisis situations. This interaction will be discussed
in the next section.
C. Empirical Evidence on Program Trading
Commentators and major reports that analyzed the crash, in-
cluding the Brady Report and the SEC Division of Market Regula-
tion Report, argue program trading has become a significant factor
in increasing overall market volatility and turned a market decline
into the crash. 124 A frequently mentioned cause of the crash is some
variant of the "cascade scenario" where the market begins a decline,
inducing portfolio insurance selling in the futures market, which is
then transferred to the cash market by index arbitrage. The result-
ing decline in the equity market triggers further portfolio insurance
selling in the futures market, and the selling is transferred from one
market to the other by index arbitragers triggering further portfolio
insurance selling and so on. While value-based investors should
eventually step in and reverse the decline, they may not buy in suffi-
cient quantities to stem the decline, such as on October 19, 1987.
However, recent evidence suggests that program trading does
not increase volatility and that the crash may have been actually
worsened by such restrictions on program trading as the uptick rule.
Grossman studies the empirical relationship between daily program
trading intensity and daily volatility on the NYSE from January
through October 1987.125 He finds "no relation between volatility
and program trading intensity. The days on which volatility was
high were not, systematically, the days on which program trading
intensity was high." 126 Furbush empirically examines the effects of
different types of program trading at the time of the crash by testing
the effects of different types of program trading over 5 minute inter-
vals from October 14 through October 20, 1987. The basic hypoth-
esis is that a divergence in prices between the futures and the cash
market should trigger index arbitrage, thereby reducing the diver-
gence between the markets. Furbush defines the term "basis error"
as the difference between the actual futures price and its theoretical
fair value (what the futures price should be given the level of the
index)., 2 7
124 See Mitchell & Netter, supra, note 100.
125 See Grossman, Program Trading and Market Volatility: A Report on Interday Relation-
ships, 44 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 18 (1988).
126 Id. at 18.
127 Theoretically basis error should arise when one market (usually futures) reacts to
news faster than the other market. When basis error becomes large enough to outweigh
transactions costs, an index arbitrage opportunity exists. The actions of the index arbi-
tragers in capturing the profit opportunity move the markets together, thus reducing
1989] 829
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
The evidence from October 14-16 supports the hypothesis.
Furbush finds that on October 14, 15, and 16, the level of basis er-
ror is a determinant of the amount of index arbitrage. Further, on
October 14, 15, and 16, price movement in the cash market was sig-
nificantly related to the amount of index arbitrage in the previous 5
minutes as index arbitrage closed the basis error. In sum, on Octo-
ber 14-16 Furbush finds that index arbitrage arose in response to
basis error, and the effect of the index arbitrage was to move the
prices of the markets together, lowering the basis error.
Furbush does not find a relationship between index arbitrage
and basis error on October 19 and 20. Despite a large discount in
the futures market (and thus a large basis error), index arbitrage did
not occur at levels high enough to link the markets and close the
discount. On October 19, while index arbitrage did occur, the tim-
ing of index arbitrage trading was not related to the basis error.
Further, the occurrence of index arbitrage did not reduce basis er-
ror. Furbush reports that index arbitrage was virtually nonexistent
on October 20 and neither was caused by nor affected by basis
error. 12
8
Furbush suggests several possible explanations for the break-
down of the index arbitrage relationship on October 19 and 20. De-
lays in executing trades caused price information to be inaccurate
and the actual basis error may have been different from the reported
basis error (the actual futures discount may be different then the
reported discount). For example, Harris argues that part of the ob-
served discount in futures at the time of the crash was due to non-
sychronous trading, 129 which occurs when the true value of the S&P
500 Index diverged from the reported value because some of the
constituent stocks had not traded.' 30 While the true value of the
underlying stocks may have changed, this change is not incorpo-
rated into the S&P 500 Index until a trade actually occurs. This was
especially true on October 19 and 20, when large numbers of stocks
were not traded at various times (for example, at 10:40 A.M. on Oc-
tober 19, 37.3% of the value of the S&P 500 was closed-IBM did
not open for over an hour). Harris develops a measure to correct
for nonsychronous trading and finds that he can explain some, but
not all, of the large basis on October 19 and 20. He concludes that
basis error. Therefore, basis error causes index arbitrage which in turn is a corrective
force lowering basis error. See Furbush, supra note 106.
128 On October 20, the December S&P 500 Future traded at a substantial premium
compared to cash in early trading, but this switched to a large discount after 10:00 A.M.
See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Report, supra note 100, at 98.
129 Harris, supra note 105.
130 We argue in a later section that index arbitrage promotes market efficiency and
did not and could not have caused the crash.
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some of the basis was also due to a disintegration of the relationship
between the two markets.
Another reason for the inability of index arbitrage to link the
two markets was an increase in the transaction costs of using index
arbitrage. A major transaction cost may have been uncertainty.
Much of index arbitrage trading is accomplished through the DOT
system, and on the afternoon of the 19th, while trades on DOT con-
tinued to be made, there was considerable uncertainty as to when
and if such trades would be executed. This uncertainty raised the
risk of index arbitrage and thus reduced its use. On October 20, the
NYSE requested that member firms curtail their use of DOT for in-
dex arbitrage and other forms of program trading, thus effectively
foreclosing index arbitrage.
Furbush also tests the effects of portfolio insurance selling in
the cash market.13 1 Since on October 14 and 15 little portfolio in-
surance existed, he only examines October 16, 19, and 20. He finds
evidence of portfolio insurance selling being associated with down-
ward cash movements on October 16 and 20. He notes that only on
the day when the index arbitrage relationship did not hold was there
a significant volume of portfolio insurance selling in the cash mar-
ket. This is expected since portfolio insurance selling in the futures
market is less costly and therefore preferable and only on the day
when the markets became unlinked did portfolio insurance selling
spill over into the cash market.
D. Summary of Empirical Evidence on Program Trading
The empirical evidence on the effects of program trading is not
consistent with the popular wisdom that program trading caused the
crash. Grossman suggests that program trading is not a cause of
increased volatility in general. Indeed, the evidence indicates that
much program trading was more a consequence of the crash than a
cause. A persistent discount in the futures market existed on the
crash dates. While nonsychronous trading provides one possible
reason for the discount, Harris finds that he can not explain all of
the divergence between the cash and futures market with non-
sychronous trading, suggesting a disintegration of the relationship
between the markets occurred. Furbush's results indicate, that at
least in the cash market, index arbitrage and portfolio insurance
trading did not overwhelm the market during the crash. Instead,
selling by others overwhelmed program trading. On October 19
and 20, despite the large discount in futures, insufficient index arbi-
131 Furbush, supra note 106.
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trage occurred to link the markets. Portfolio insurance had little ef-
fect on the decline.
E. Effects of the Uncoupling of the Futures and Cash Markets
and the Role of the Uptick Rule
The disintegration of the linkage between the futures and the
cash markets at the time of the crash had several harmful effects. It
contributed to the general climate of uncertainty and weakening
confidence in the markets just when confidence was imperative. In
addition, the persistent discount in the futures market discouraged
institutional buyers from entering the equity market, especially on
the afternoon of October 19,132 since the discount indicated that
buyers of equity could wait and obtain even lower prices.133 Simi-
larly, the discounts discouraged block positioning firms from risking
capital in positioning blocks of equities. Further, the discounts in
futures prices induced portfolio insurance selling in the cash market
rather than the futures market, perhaps causing a greater price de-
cline than if the selling had occurred in the futures market.
The uptick rule may have contributed to the uncoupling of the
futures and the cash market. The uptick rule makes index arbitrage
more costly because it makes it more difficult to immediately sell a
basket of stocks. This becomes especially relevant when index arbi-
tragers do not hold a large equity position, and on October 19 and
20, index arbitragers may have been in that situation. To the extent
that a discount in futures existed, arbitragers should have bought
futures and sold stock. However, arbitragers may have been cash
poor at that time after three days of selling (October 14, 15,and
16).1 34 Therefore, as part of a sell program, they would have had to
short sell certain stocks into the declining prices that prevailed on
October 19. Those short sales would have had to wait for an uptick
on the biggest one day decline in history. Not surprisingly, the up-
tick rule hampered index arbitrage.1 35
132 MARKET BREAK STUDY, supra note 49, at 3-13.
133 This is also why there are calls for sunshine trading by portfolio insurers, a pro-
cedure where they announce their trading plans, thus limiting the price pressure of their
trading.
134 We have no aggregate data on the equity positions of arbitragers on October 19.
However, several index arbitragers have told us their equity positions were depleted by
October 19 and that the uptick rule inhibited their sales of equity. Further, MARKET
BREAK STUDY, supra note 49, at 2-16 states that 25% of index arbitrage selling on Octo-
ber 19 was short selling.
135 Letter fromJames E. Buck to George A. Fitzsimmons (Mar. 17, 1977) (The New
York Stock Exchange); letter from William F. Deirn to George A. Fitzsimmons (Apr. 4,
1977) (The New York Stock Exchange Institutional Advisory Committee on Trading);
letter from Edward I. O'Brien to George A. Fitzsimmons (Apr. 15, 1977) (Securities
Industry Association); letter from Norman S. Poser to George A. Fitzsimmons (May 4,
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Evidence suggests that index arbitrage failed to halt the uncou-
pling of the markets that occurred on October 19. Since there
seemed to be a large profit opportunity for index arbitragers, it is
not obvious why they failed to respond immediately to the diver-
gence in prices between the futures and the cash markets. Again,
the uptick rule, which inhibits the ability of arbitragers to immedi-
ately sell stock, may have been a factor.
The uptick rule therefore could have played a critical role in the
failure of index arbitrage to link the markets and the resulting
chaos. Uncoupling of the equity and futures markets may have been
a major factor in the seeming breakdown in the markets during the
crash. Fama states: "Breaking the links between stocks and futures
prices can only add to the informational chaos of high volatility peri-
ods."'136 We argue the uptick rule may have contributed to the un-
coupling of the markets during the crash. Policy makers should
follow policies that link the markets, including relaxing the uptick
rule, especially for index arbitragers. Those who argue the uptick
rule has a place in the regulation of arbitrage desire a policy of
"throwing sand in the gears" or slowing the markets down. Unfor-
tunately, in today's environment such policies can only destabilize
markets and hamper their efficiency.
V
CHANGING THE UPTICK RuI]E
Given that the uptick rule impairs market efficiency, why does it
still exist? It is appropriate to address this question in two parts
because of relatively recent developments in the securities markets.
First, why was there little support for the 1976 SEC proposals for
relaxation or elimination of the uptick rule? 137 Second, today, when
the uptick rule interferes with index arbitrage, why does it still
survive?
We identified a group that benefits somewhat from the uptick
rule-block traders. The effect of the uptick rule on block trades
likely was instrumental in the 1980 SEC decision to not relax the
rule.13 8 However, developments in financial markets in recent years
1977) (American Stock Exchange Inc.). Crossen, supra note 96, reports that on January
8, 1988, when the Dow fell 140.58 points the uptick rule hindered the actions of index
arbitragers and thus contributed to an unlinking of the futures and cash markets. Fu-
tures were selling at a discount and arbitragers wanted to sell stocks and buy futures.
The uptick rule meant that many traders could not sell stock and thus eliminated futures
buyers, which in turn contributed to a downward slide in futures prices.
136 Fama, supra note 108, at 79.
137 Short Sales of Securities, supra note 13.
138 Letters written in 1977 by the New York Stock Exchange, The NYSE Institu-
tional Advisory Committee on Trading, The Securities Industry Association, American
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have made the uptick rule much less important to block traders.
The growth in the trading of options has made it easier for market
professionals to trade on knowledge of a pending block sale. Fur-
ther, the growth of international trading,' such as the London Stock
Exchange, in markets without an uptick rule have provided other
opportunities to trade on information about a pending block sale.
Additionally, many other developments such as the growth of fu-
'tures trading have contributed to much greater liquidity in today's
market and less importance to block traders of the uptick rule. Fi-
nally, a broad limitation on all short sales is not an efficient way to
protect block traders since it only helps block traders in certain situ-
ations while it hinders market efficiency in general.
Another group that may benefit from the uptick rule, and there-
fore would oppose its removal, is larger broker dealers. To the ex-
tent they hold large, well-diversified portfolios they can sell many
stocks on bad information without waiting for an uptick. Smaller
firms, however, who are not long in a stock would have to wait for an
uptick to short sell. This can be especially critical in index arbitrage
and can restrict smaller firms from using this strategy.
A broad restriction on short selling impairs market efficiency in
general by delaying the execution of trades. Grossman and Miller
suggest that the cost of delayed trades is in general the increased
risk of an adverse price movement.13 9 This cost climbs the greater
the volatility of stocks. In today's equity markets, the delay costs of
the uptick rule perhaps fall most on index arbitrage, which relies on
the ability to trade large portfolios of stock quickly.
We suggest several reasons explain why the rule still exists. In
part, it may be because of institutional inertia-although the pur-
pose of the regulation is no longer relevant, the benefits from de-
regulation are not sufficient to induce deregulation. 140 In the late
1970s, the institutional costs of changing the rule, combined with
the benefits of the rule to block traders, were sufficient to overcome
the somewhat limited benefits to the market as a whole and the rule
remained. In the mid 1980s, benefits from elimination of the rule
grew and perhaps if the crash had not occurred, there would have
Society of Corporate Secretaries, and the American Stock Exchange in response to the
SEC proposal all mention the adverse effect on block traders as a reason to not change
the uptick rule.
139 Grossman & Miller, supra note 50.
140 See McCormick, Shugart & Tollison, The Disinterest in Regulation, 74 AM. ECON.
REV. 1075 (1984) (providing a general analysis of why many regulations continue to
exist even when they appear to no longer to serve their original purpose. They argue
the costs of regulation, such as the uptick rule, are the original rent seeking expendi-
tures on activities that led to the regulation. Since the costs are sunk, there is little
incentive for deregulation, but it is not worth the effort to change it). See also G. CALA-
BRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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been sufficient pressure to eliminate the rule. Exchanges are con-
cerned that trading could be lost to overseas markets where short
selling can occur without the rule. In addition, index arbitragers
face higher costs because of the rule and would like to see it elimi-
nated. However, the stock market crash has provided regulators
and the stock exchanges with renewed interest in preserving the
rule. From a public relations point of view, restrictions on short
selling are popular with the investing public. Further, restrictions
on index arbitrage reduce the attractiveness of the futures markets
and thus may benefit the stock exchanges. Therefore, in the present
climate an elimination of the uptick rule may not be politically
feasible.
CONCLUSION
The uptick rule is a restriction on short selling which hinders
the efficiency promoting aspects of short selling on the pricing of
individual securities and index arbitrage. It is unlikely in today's
highly developed market that "bear raids" could seriously disrupt
the workings of the market. Bear raids are most likely to be a prob-
lem for OTC firms, where there is presently no uptick rule. How-
ever, the major cost of the uptick rule is in hampering index
arbitrage. Index arbitrage relies on the ability to buy and sell bas-
kets of stock quickly at prevailing prices. Index arbitrage improves
market efficiency by linking the futures and cash markets, transfer-
ring information quickly between the markets. The uptick rule can
hinder index arbitrage by delaying the ability of arbitragers to short
sell a security quickly. While in certain cases the uptick rule protects
property rights of block traders, this has become less important over
time, and a broad restriction on short sales is not an efficient way to
protect this property right.
Theory and empirical evidence suggest that restrictions on in-
dex arbitrage helped to uncouple the equity and futures market on
October 19, 1987, exacerbating the decline and helping to turn the
decline into a crash. To the extent the uptick rule had a role in the
crash, it exacerbated the unlinking of the markets.
The implications of our arguments are that the uptick rule
should at least be relaxed for index arbitragers, and probably for all
traders. The uptick rule hinders the immediacy of trading so neces-
sary in today's sophisticated markets. In today's markets it is imper-
ative that traders have free access to index arbitrage. While
politically the suggestion that the uptick rule be relaxed for program
traders would not be attractive, a reasonable understanding of mar-
kets suggests this change would improve market operations.
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